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TORT REFORM BY THE MIssissIPPI SUPREME COURT
John W. Christopher
The topic of class-action suits in Mississippi has already begun to make
the rounds and when the subject is discussed, everybody has an opinion.
However, the only opinion that counts is the collective opinion of the jus-
tices of the Mississippi Supreme Court. For it is that court which has de-
cided the rules by which law is practiced in this state.
For the past several years, there was a huge clamor among the business
interests for "tort reform" in which they painted the tort system in Missis-
sippi as being an evil giant. Therefore, it was not surprising that former
Governor Ronnie Musgrove called a special session of the Mississippi legis-
lature shortly after Labor Day in 2002, which stayed in session for approxi-
mately eighty-three days and passed out "tort reform" legislation which
was signed by the Governor. During the 2003 gubernatorial campaign,
then-candidate Haley Barbour stumped the state around a rallying cry of
more tort reform. Therefore, it was even less surprising that at the end of
the 2004 session of the legislature that Governor Barbour called the legisla-
ture back into special session for more "tort reform."
All eyes have been focused on the actions of the legislature and the
"tort reform" legislation has been trumpeted by Governor Barbour and
others as being the centerpiece of making Mississippi "business friendly"
and developing a climate where business can flourish without fear of "friv-
olous lawsuits."
Probably no members of the public, and few members of the legal pro-
fession, have been watching the "tort reform" which has been brought
about by the Mississippi Supreme Court. In no area is that more dramatic
than in the area of joinder of multiple parties in the same case in the same
court.
Prior to January 1, 1982, procedure was developed on a case-by-case
basis in the courts, notably the Supreme Court, and there was no one book
in which you could look to find the rules of civil procedure. The rules were
imbedded in the case law developed by the Mississippi Supreme Court
since statehood and needless to say, whether the rule was one of civil pro-
cedure, criminal procedure, or evidence, a substantial amount of research
was required to find the law.
All of that began to change in the late 1970s when there was a move-
ment in the courts to adopt rules to govern the civil procedure in the trial
courts of the State. That culminated in the Mississippi Supreme Court's
approval of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, which became effec-
tive on January 1, 1982.1 The order adopting the Mississippi Rules of Civil
Procedure entered on May 26, 1981, stated the following:
1. Order Adopting the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, Miss. Cases 395-97 So. 2d 1 (1981).
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Pursuant to the inherent authority vested in this Court by
the Constitution of the State of Mississippi, as discussed in
Cecil Newell, Jr. v. State of Mississippi, 308 So. 2d 71 (Miss.
1975), to promote justice, uniformity, and the efficiency of
courts, the rules attached hereto are adopted and promul-
gated as Rules of Practice and Procedure in all Chancery,
Circuit and, County Courts of this State in all civil actions
filed on and after January 1, 1982, and any and all statutes
and court rules previously adopted to the contrary notwith-
standing, and in the event of a conflict between these rules
and any statute or court rule previously adopted these rules
shall control.
2
Among the rules effectively repealed by the Supreme Court's order of
May 26, 1981, were class-action suits, of a very limited nature, which could
have been brought in chancery courts of this state.
A reading of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure reflects that they
were taken almost verbatim from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with
several exceptions, the most notable of which being that Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on class actions was omitted. Therefore,
as of January 1, 1982, the chancery courts of this State ceased to have juris-
diction to entertain class-action suits.
Practicing law without the benefit of the class-action Rule 23, lawyers
began to search for ways to accomplish the end result of class-action litiga-
tion. While some chose to proceed by joining multiple parties under Rule
20, others proceeded under the old chancery practice of permitting class
actions in limited circumstances.
Rule 20 reads as follows:
(a) Permissive Joinder. All persons may join in one action
as plaintiffs if they assert any right to relief jointly, severally,
or in the alternative in respect of or arising out of the same
transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occur-
rences, and if any question of law or fact common to all of
these persons will arise in the action. All persons may be
joined in one action as defendants if there is asserted against
them jointly, severally, or in the alternative, any right to re-
lief in respect of or rising out of the same transaction, occur-
rence, or series of transactions or occurrences, and if any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise
in the action. A plaintiff or defendant need not be inter-
ested in obtaining or defending against all the relief de-
manded. Judgment may be given for one or more of the
plaintiffs according to their respective rights to relief, and
2. Id. (emphasis added).
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against one or more defendants according to their respec-
tive liabilities.
(b) Separate Trials. The court may make such orders as
will prevent a party from being embarrassed, delayed, or
put to expense by the inclusion of a party against whom he
asserts no claim and who asserts no claim against the party,
and may order separate trials or make other orders to pre-
vent delay or prejudice.'
There are three cases which should be read and studied by each stu-
dent of the law in the area of class-action litigation in Mississippi, and those
three cases will be analyzed separately.
The Supreme Court addressed the joinder issue in the absence of a
class-action rule in American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida v.
Alexander.4
American Bankers' interlocutory appeal in the consolidation of five
cases from four separate counties with approximately 1371 plaintiffs was
considered by the court.5 American Bankers had filed motions to dismiss
in each of the cases on the basis that joinder of multiple plaintiffs was im-
proper under Rule 20 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and in
each of the cases the motions had been denied by the trial courts.6 The
Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal to resolve the issue of
joinder.7
The holding of the Court was:
After consideration, we find that joinder of the plain-
tiffs' claims are proper pursuant to Rule 20 of the Missis-
sippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The alleged claims arise out
of the same series of transactions or occurrences and satisfy
the commonality requirement of Rule 20 with respect to
common issues of fact and law. We also find that the plain-
tiffs' causes of action are not preempted by the filed rate
doctrine. This case is not a rate case, but as set out in the
amended complaints they are combination of contract, tort
and statutory actions brought under the laws of Mississippi.
All of these causes of action are founded in common law
and are not preempted by state statutes. Lastly, the original
and amended complaints filed by the plaintiffs adequately
set forth causes of action sounding in fraud. For the reasons
3. Miss. R. Civ. P. 20(a)-(b).
4. 818 So.2d 1073 (Miss. 2001).
5. Id. at 1074.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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set forth below, this Court affirms the trial court's ruling on
American Bankers' motion to sever and allow joinder.8
In further writing for the Supreme Court, Justice McRae quoted the
official comment to Rule 20, which at that time stated the following: "The
general philosophy of the joinder provisions of these Rules is to allow vir-
tually unlimited joinder at the pleading stage but to give the Court discre-
tion to shape the trial to the necessities of the particular case."9
The Court's affirmation of the trial court's denial of American Bank-
ers' motion to sever and dismiss the multiple plaintiffs' claims was based in
part on the court's analogy that Mississippi lacked the class-action Rule 23.
In discussing class actions, Justice McRae wrote:
This court is mindful of the teachings of the United States
Supreme Court in cases employing Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23. The court said in Amchem Prods., Inc., v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138 L.Ed.2d 689
(1977): The policy at the very core of the class action mech-
anism is to overcome the problem that small recoveries do
not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo
action prosecuting his or her rights. A class action solves
this problem by aggregating the relatively paltry potential
recoveries into something worth someone's (usually an at-
torney's) labor.1°
The Mississippi Supreme Court, citing the case of Mississippi High
School Activities Ass'n., Inc. v. Coleman" stated that the Supreme Court
had "taken notice of the unavailability of class actions and had liberalized
the rules of civil procedure at times in order to better accommodate parties
who are consequently shut out the legal system." 2
In American Bankers, the supreme court went on to state that "all of
the plaintiffs' claims ar[o]se out of the same pattern of conduct, the same
type of insurance, and involve[d] interpretation of the same master pol-
icy."' 13 The Court reasoned that all of the plaintiffs' claims were similar
with the exception of the actual dollar amount each had been charged for
premiums, and thereupon approved the joinder of multiple plaintiffs
against the defendants in the litigation.14
While it is not a part of the decision, it should be noted that American
Bankers was authored by Justice McRae who was joined by Chief Justice
8. Id. at 1074-75 (footnote omitted).
9. Id. at 1075 (quoting Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 cmt. (2003) (revised Feb. 20, 2004)).
10. Id. at 1077-78.
11. 631 So. 2d 768 (Miss. 1994).
12. Am. Bankers, 818 So.2d at 1078.
13. Id. at 1079.
14. Id.
[VOL. 24:427
2005] TORT REFORM BY THE MISSISSIPPI SUPREME COURT 431
Pittman, Presiding Justice Banks, and Justices Diaz and Easley. 15 Justice
Waller wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Smith, Mills and
Cobb.16 It is submitted that this alignment of the justices on American
Bankers should be kept in mind as one reviews the change in the philoso-
phy of the Supreme Court on the issue of multiple joinders under Rule 20.
The second case of note arose in the context of the chancery action
filed in the Chancery Court of Panola County. The case was USF&G In-
surance Company of Mississippi v. Walls.17 This case does not yet have the
official Southern Reporter citation, presumably because it has been held on
a petition for rehearing.
This case presented the issue as a class-action suit filed in the Chan-
cery Court of Panola County wherein George Walls and Roxie Wells filed a
suit in chancery court individually and "on behalf of a clearly ascertainable
class of others similarly situated., 18 "[The] 'class' allegedly consisted of
USF&G insureds and those who were injured by USF&G insureds."' 9
USF&G filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the class
actions could not be maintained under Mississippi law.2 ° The chancellor
denied the motion for summary judgment but certified the plaintiffs'
class. 1 The Supreme Court granted USF&G's petition for interlocutory
appeal and addressed one question: "[D]oes Mississippi recognize 'equita-
ble class actions' in chancery, despite an omission of Rule 23 from our
Rules of Civil Procedure?
22
The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, but in do-
ing so provided us with a comprehensive history of class actions in Missis-
sippi. In the opinion authored by Justice Graves, the court took note of the
conflict between the absence of class actions in Mississippi and the provi-
sions of Section 11-53-37, Mississippi Code Annotated, adopted in 1948
which states:
Where a party hereafter institutes a suit for the benefit of
himself and all others similarly situated, and thereby there is
in such suit recovered or preserved property or a fund for
the common benefit, the chancery court may make an allow-
ance to such party of the reasonable costs incurred, which
costs shall include the necessary disbursements, and reason-
able solicitor's fees, out of the property recovered or pre-
served for the common benefit.2 3
15. Id. at 1073.
16. Id.
17. No. 2002-IA-00185-SCT, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 657 (Miss. June 10, 2004).
18. Id. at *2, 3.
19. Id.
20. Id. at *2, 4.
21. Id. at *3, 9 4.
22. Id.
23. USF&G, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 657, at *6, 1 9 (quoting Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-53-37 (Rev.
2002)) (alteration in original) (third emphasis added).
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The court recognized that the statute was in conflict with the Rules of
Civil Procedure, especially in light of the fact that Mississippi does not have
a class-action Rule 23.24
Justice Graves, in concluding the opinion, states:
At best, this statute raises an inference of the existence of
class actions. However, an inference is not tantamount to a
class action provision. Our Rules of Civil Procedure "apply
to all civil proceedings" in circuit and chancery court.
M.R.C.P. 81; M.R.C.P. 1. Since there is no rule or statute
which expressly or impliedly provides for class actions, we
are compelled to conclude that they are not permitted in
any legal proceedings in our state courts. Thus, the chan-
cery court erred in concluding otherwise.
Justice Graves was joined in the opinion by Chief Justice Smith, Pre-
siding Justices Waller and Cobb, and Justice Dickinson; Justices Carlson
and Randolph concurred in the results only with Judge Easley concurring
in part and dissenting in part without a separate opinion and Justice Diaz
not participating. 6
It is apparent that with the departure from the Mississippi Supreme
Court of Chief Justice Pittman and Presiding Justice McRae, that the
makeup of the court accounts in part for the shift in the court's position
since American Bankers, which was decided on February 1, 2001.
The third and final case to be discussed is Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.,
v. Armond.z7 Janssen was sued by Armond and fifty-five other Mississippi
plaintiffs in Jones County Circuit Court for injuries that they alleged were
caused by taking a prescription medication, Propulsid. 28 The plaintiffs
sought recovery upon the theories of strict liability, negligence, breach of
warranty, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, deceit/civil conspiracy, agent
misrepresentation, product liability, and medical malpractice/negligence. 29
The plaintiffs sought to hold all of the defendants jointly and severally lia-
ble to each of the plaintiffs for compensatory and punitive damages.30 The
defendants had filed a "Motion to Sever and Transfer Venue for Separate
Trials," which was denied by the circuit court resulting in an interlocutory
appeal being granted by the Mississippi Supreme Court.31 The opinion
written by Justice Cobb succinctly stated the heart of the case as follows:
24. Id. at *10, 1 15.
25. Id. at *13-14, 22.
26. Id. at *1.
27. 866 So. 2d 1092 (Miss. 2004).
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This case brings to light important issues of joinder and
venue under Mississippi law in complex personal injury suits
which involve: multiple diverse plaintiffs suing multiple di-
verse defendants; combinations of medical malpractice,
products liability, and other diverse claims; complex causa-
tion issues with voluminous amounts of evidence; and po-
tentially large damage awards. Although the defendants
have raised three issues in this appeal, we find the issue of
proper application of Rule 20 to be dispositive and, thus, do
not reach the remaining issues.3"
The court appears in Janssen to be trying to set a new course for the
judiciary in applying Rule 20 without specifically overruling prior prece-
dence. It is interesting to note that Justice Cobb, in the majority opinion,
states:
In the relatively few joinder cases decided by this Court
to date, we have given broad discretion to the trial court to
allow joinder of claims. See Illinois Cent. R. R. v. Travis, 808
So.2d 928, 931 (Miss. 2002) ("The general philosophy of the
joinder provisions of these Rules is to allow virtually unlim-
ited joinder at the pleading stage, but to give the Court dis-
cretion to shape the trial to the necessities of the particular
case."). However, we have not heretofore been faced with
facts as compelling as those in the current case, which are in
stark contrast to those in prior cases decided by this Court.
See Am. Bankers Ins. Co. v. Alexander, 818 So.2d 1073
(Miss. 2001).
We hold today that the prescribing of the drug Propul-
sid by 42 different physicians to 56 different patients did not
arise out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences, and that joinder in this case un-
fairly prejudices the defendants. We hold that this joinder
was improper and that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the motion to sever and transfer. We reverse the
trial court's order and remand the case for severance of all
claims against defendants who have no connection with
Armond. This would include all physicians who have not
prescribed Propulsid to Armond. We also instruct the trial
court to transfer the severed cases to those jurisdictions in
which each plaintiff could have brought his or her claims
without reliance on another of the improperly joined
plaintiffs.
'33
32. Id. at 1094.
33. Janssen, 866 So.2d at 1094-95.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
After making a considerable effort to distinguish the court's prior
holdings allowing joinder under Rule 20, the court found that the joinder of
the claims in Janssen were improper and remanded the case to the circuit
judge to sever all claims that could not have properly been brought in Jones
County and to transfer those cases to the counties of proper venue.34 In so
holding, the court distinguished its ruling from its prior decisions in Ameri-
can Bankers and Illinois Central R.R. v. Travis. In conclusion, the Court
stated:
We hold that joinder of these [Janssen] claims was improper
and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
motion to sever and transfer. The facts of this case distin-
guish it from Travis, the case relied on by the trial court to
deny the motion to sever. In Travis, there was a single de-
fendant, and the issues revolved around the negligence of
this defendant. Also in Travis, this Court found that all
claims arose out of an occurrence common to all plaintiffs:
namely, the defendants' policy of not warning or protecting
its workers from hazards of asbestos exposure and defen-
dant's breaching its duty to provide a reasonably safe work
place.35
Justice Graves wrote a specially concurring opinion concurring in the
results reached by the majority but opining that Mississippi should adopt
the class-action rule that would provide due process for all parties.36 Jus-
tice Graves then stated a short historical review of class actions in Missis-
sippi, and he observed that:
It is no wonder that a type of "super-joinder" arose
under our Rule 20. Plaintiffs in our state courts were for-
bidden from invoking any sort of class action, and so joinder
slowly grew to encompass the massive and unwieldy actions
the majority rightfully struggles with today. We have always
wrestled with defining the scope of permissive joinder.
From the very moment we adopted the rule we displayed
ambivalence, announcing that "[j]oinder of parties under
Rule 20(a) is not unlimited," while only a few sentences
later stating that "[t]he general philosophy of the joinder
provisions of these rules is to allow unlimited joinder .. .
Miss. R. Civ. P. 20 cmt.
For too long our Rule 20 has been stretched and pulled
in various directions, and forced to accomplish tasks it was
34. Id. at 1095.
35. Id. at 1101-02.
36. Id. at 1102.
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never designed to do. The majority today does not amelio-
rate that unfortunate situation. It is imperative that we
modernize our rules of civil procedure by adopting a class
action provision. This is completely in accordance with our
recent desire to modernize, as shown by the amendment of
Miss. R. Evid. 702 (adhering to the Daubert standard over
Frye) and the adoption of Miss. R. Civ. P. 35 (allowing the
physical and mental examination of parties to a case).3 7
Justice Graves succinctly went to the heart of the problem, which is
faced by litigants and attorneys in Mississippi during this time when class
actions do not exist and Rule 20 for joinder of parties is, for all practical
purposes, unavailable.
CONCLUSION
As I said at the beginning, the tort reform in this area has come from
the Court and not by way of the legislature. It is now up to the Supreme
Court to consider adopting Rule 23 for the implementation of class actions
in Mississippi. To fail to do so will result in many Mississippians being de-
prived of the opportunity to seek redress in the courts because their claim
is too complicated or too small to justify the expense that would be in-
curred to prosecute the case on an individual basis. Only the ability to
institute class actions in Mississippi will alleviate the problem.
37. Id. at 1103 (alteration in original).

